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AQUINAS, HELL, AND THE
RESURRECTION OF THE DAMNED
Michael Potts

Based on themes in Aquinas, this paper adds to the defense of the doctrine
of an eternal hell, focusing on the state of those in hell after the resurrection.
I first summarize the Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a bodysoul unity, showing why existence as a separated soul is truncated and
unnatural. Next, I discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which
restores an essential aspect of human nature, even for the damned. This
reveals the love of God since He gives the damned the best human existence
they can possibly have given their disordered wills. Finally, I defend this
position against three important objections.

One of the more interesting developments in contemporary philosophy
of religion is the revival of interest in the doctrine of hell. It is well
known that the notion of the wicked eternally suffering after death is a
significant problem for theodicy. If any belief seems incompatible with
the existence of an omnibenevolent God, it is this doctrine. Indeed,
some Christian philosophers, such as John Hick, argue that hell is temporary; all people will eventually respond to the love and mercy of
God. ' Others, such as Richard Swinburne, have defended the notion
that the wicked will be annihilated after death. 2 These options seem
much easier for the Christian to defend than the traditional doctrine.
Given this difficulty, it is remarkable that there are a number of contemporary Christian philosophers who defend the traditional doctrine of an
eternal hell for the wicked.' These include Peter Geach, Jerry L. Walls,
and Eleonore Stump: I believe that the approach of Stump, based on
Thomistic metaphysics, is one of the more promising approaches to
defending the traditional doctrine of hell. To oversimplify, Stump
assumes with Aquinas that goodness and being are identical. Since this
is the case, God's keeping the damned in existence is metaphysically better than annihilating them. It also shows love for the damned, for it not
only keeps "the damned from doing further evil," but it also
prevents their further disintegration, their further loss of goodness
and being. He [God] cannot increase or fulfill the being of the
damned; but by putting restraints on the evil they can do, he can
maximize their being by keeping them from additional decay.5
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God is allowing the damned as much goodness and being as their selfchosen nature allows them to have. In this way, hell shows the love of
God, in that God unites Himself with the damned as much as their evil
nature permits." Therefore, the existence of hell is compatible with the
love and goodness of God.
Like Stump, I believe the traditional doctrine of an eternal hell for the
wicked is defensible. In this paper, working from the metaphysics and
theology of Thomas Aquinas, I will focus on the state of those in hell after
the resurrection. I will argue that the resurrection, even of the damned,
reverses the "metaphysical horror"7 of death: the unnatural separation of
soul from body. Although the damned, by turning away from the highest good, God, are in one sense totally removed from the actuality or fullness of human nature, in another sense they have as much human being
as is possible for them in their evil state. That is, after the resurrection,
the damned will have their soul-body unity restored, and since the soulbody unity is essential to human nature, this is a metaphysical good for
the damned. Deliverance from death, even for the damned, is a gift of
grace due to the sacrifice of Christ. It is obvious that Aquinas' thought on
these matters contains a mixture of philosophical and specifically
Christian theological elements, and this mixture will be reflected in my
discussion. The first section of the paper will summarize the well-known
Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, and why
existence as a separated soul (as far as nature is concerned) is a truncated,
unnatural state. In the second section I will discuss the soul-body
reunion at the resurrection, which restores an important aspect of human
nature, even for the damned. Hell reveals the love and mercy of God
towards the damned since God gives them as much being and goodness
as He possibly can given their disordered wills. The final section will
defend this position against three important objections.
1.

It is well known that Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that the
human person is not the body alone (as the Atomists and contemporary
physicalists believe) or the soul alone (as Plato and Descartes believe)
but the soul-body composite. As Brian Davies points out, Aquinas
"adopts a position midway between the extremes of Dualism and
Physicalism."~ The soul, for Aquinas as well as for Aristotle, is "the
form of the body."g The words "form" and "of the body" are both
important. Form is the principle of being; it is the principle of actuality,
as opposed to matter, the principle of potentiality. In living things, the
soul is the form which gives them life. In the case of the human being,
"the soul is that which gives the human body its act of existing."l0
Aquinas believes that without the soul, a dead body which was once
human can no longer properly be called "human," except in an equivocal sense. ll The soul is therefore what gives otherwise dead matter its
life and specific actuality as a particular kind of living thing.
But the soul is not the whole human person; the soul is the form of the
body. The soul and body require each other for their mutual completion.
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The main reason for this is found in Aquinas' theory of human knowledge. Following Aristotle, Aquinas believes that all knowledge begins
with sense experience. The intellect knows by abstracting the intelligible
content from material objects, and in order to do this the intellect
requires a "phantasm" or sense image. '2 Even memory, needed for recall
of previous knowledge, depends on phantasms. u And, as Aquinas says,
since the operation of a sense is performed through a bodily organ,
it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its
nature, to be united to a body, and to be part of the human species,
not having a complete species in itself. 14
It is therefore natural for the soul to be united to a body, so much so that
Aquinas quotes with agreement Aristotle's statement "that it is unnecessary to ask whether the soul and the body are one, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether the wax and its impression are one."!; Aquinas is
clearly not a dualist in the Platonic or Cartesian sense; he affirms that the
human being is the body-soul composite, and that this is the natural
state of the human species. Indeed, this is reflected in the definition of a
human being as a "rational animal." Animality, which includes material
bodily existence, is just as necessary for the fullness of the human
species as the soul.!6
Given this strong affirmation of the unity of the human person, it
might seem that Aquinas would believe that when a human being dies,
he or she is "dead like Rover," dead all over, at least until the resurrection. But Aquinas does believe that the intellectual soul (i.e., the human
soul, since the proper act of the human being is the act of the intellect) is
incorruptible; thus, it survives death. Physical organs are oriented to
particular things; the sense of sight, for example, sees individual objects.
But the intellect understands the universal and therefore cannot be just
the act of a physical organ, since understanding the universal transcends
the power of physical bodies. Plus, the intellect naturally desires always
to be, and a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore, the intellectual
soul is incorruptible 17 and survives the corruption of the physical body.
However, given that the complete human being is not the soul, but
the soul-body composite, at death the human person does not survive in
his or her fullness. Davies again puts it well:

if I die and only my soul survives, then I do not survive. For my
soul is the soul of Brian Davies. And Brian Davies is a particular,
perishable, bodily individual. Destroy my body, therefore, and
Brian Davies ceases to exist. 18
Again, this is partly related to the human mode of knowing, which is
dependent upon sense images. In fact, this is the only way that humans
can know individual things. Without the body, the soul can by nature
only know individual things it knew while embodied on earth. It can
also receive non-sensory infused species from separate substances (i.e.,
angels), but this knowledge is confused and indistinct. 19 This is the nat-
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ural state of the separated soul, (although God can directly infuse
knowledge of individual things into the separated souls of the blessed).20
Death, the separation of body and soul, diminishes the distinctly human
activity of rationality, and thereby diminishes the humanity of those
who die. 21 It also destroys the ability to feel passions such as "sensory
love or hate, sadness or joy, anger, fear, or boldness,"22 since these contain, according to Aquinas, a necessary bodily component." As such, the
ability to control the passions by reason, a necessary component of the
moral life, is missing in the separated souP'
It is no surprise, then, that Aquinas considers the state of the separated soul as "unnatural." In fact, "the human soul...[has] an aptitude and
a natural inclination to be united to the body."2s As such,
to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature,
and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is
not natural to it, and hence it is united to the body in order that it
may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. 26
The separation of the soul from the body at death places the soul in an
unnatural state; and inasmuch as it keeps rational creatures from returning to God in the fullness of their natures (since they have diminished
cognition), death is a "metaphysical horror," a disruption "in the very
order of the universe."" The embodied human person is more conformed to God than the separated soul:
Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more
perfect than outside the body, because it is part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the
whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is
not simply. Because strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed
to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires since
then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. 28
Death marks a diminution in the amount of being in a human being; as I
have noted, the separated soul cannot even properly be said to be a human
person. Personal identity, properly speaking, is disrupted at death
(although enough is preserved to help guarantee identity between death
and resurrection). This is the case not only for the souls of the blessed, but
also for the souls of the damned. God wills to give people as much being
and goodness as possible. Even the damned, while existing as separated
souls, lack some being and goodness which they might otherwise have.
Their souls have some kind of truncated, albeit miserable, existence. But
they lack the fullness of human nature, including the abilities to sense
(which is the basis of intellectual knowledge) and to feel passions. The
damned do not even properly have the dignity of receiving just punishment for offenses which were committed in the body, since punishment for
deeds done in the body must be meted out to the person, body and soul.
This is true in spite of Aquinas' position that human beings, even as disembodied souls, immediately go to heaven or hell after death (with the excep-
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tion of those souls who need cleansing in purgatory).2" Although the
damned, as disembodied souls, are undergoing punishment for sins committed in their earthly existence, their ultimate punishment (and just
deserts) awaits their bodily resurrection. As Aquinas puts it, "But in this
life men, composed of soul and body, sin or act rightly. Therefore in both
the soul and the body men deserve reward or punishment."3') His point is
that since the soul is not the human being, but the soul-body composite,
ultimately the body's resurrection is required to reward or punish the complete human being, body and soul. The punishment of the damned prior
to such resurrection is a temporary measure. Although their souls are suffering the misery which necessarily results from their choice against God,
full and adequate punishment awaits the resurrection. For all these reasons, death is a metaphysical horror for all human beings, the saved as
well as the damned, even though God by His grace mitigates this horror
for the blessed by infusing intellectual species into their souls.
II.

This state of separation of soul and body, by the grace of God, will
not last forever. Again, we must remember the fundamental Thomistic
principle that grace fulfills nature. If death, due to sin, disrupts not only
the order of human nature, but of the universe itself, then it is fitting that
God would remedy this situation. As is the case with human death,
Aquinas speaks of the resurrection as being in some sense natural, but in
another sense, the gracious act of God.
The resurrection is natural in the sense that it restores the proper
structure of human nature: human beings are a composite of body and
soul. As Aquinas puts it:
the soul is naturally united to the body, for in essence it is the form
of the body. It is, then, contrary to the nature of the soul to be
without the body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be
perpetual. Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body.
Since, then, it persists perpetually, it must once again be united to
the body; and thus to rise again. Therefore, the immortality of the
soul seems to demand a future resurrection of bodies."
Humans also have a natural tendency to happiness, which cannot be fulfilled unless they live with the fullness of their nature, as body-soul composites. 32 Of course only the blessed who have chosen the highest end will attain
this happiness, but it would not be possible without the resurrection of the
body. Also, in order for the proper distribution of rewards and punishments
to be made by God, it is necessary that the soul be reunited to the body, since
it is the human being, body and soul, which acts rightly or wrongly."
From these considerations it might seem that the resurrection of all
human beings is wholly a natural event and not an act of grace. Montague
Brown argues that since not all will be saved, the resurrection of all "is not
wholly an act of grace." Indeed, we need "to distinguish ... two meanings of
resurrection-the one of nature for all, and the one of grace for the elect."""
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The resurrection of all is an act of grace, Brown claims, in the sense that all
beings are products of grace, in so far as they are creations of God that act
according to their natures." As Aquinas puts it,
Resurrection is natural if one considers its purpose, for it is natural
that the soul be united to the body. But the principle of resurrection is not natural. It is caused by the divine power alone.'6
However, in addition to the grace of divine power needed to raise a
dead person to life, there remains a sense in which the resurrection of all
human beings is an effect of the special supernatural grace shown by God
through Jesus Christ. Christ came not just to free human beings from sin
but also from death; freedom from physical death is a gift which all people shall share, whether they be blessed or damned.'? Aquinas says:
For the Son of God assumed human nature to restore it. Therefore,
what is a defect of nature will be restored in all, and so all will
return from death to life. .... For the necessity of dying is a deficiency brought upon human nature by sin. But Christ, by the merit of
his passion, repaired the deficiencies of nature which sin had
brought upon nature. 3H
One purpose of the resurrection is to restore human nature in its fullness, at least in the sense that the human body-soul composite will be
restored. The resurrection restores the "final perfection of the human
species" since the human species is incomplete as long as it consists of
separated souls. "Therefore, it is necessary for alL.to rise again."39
Christ indeed died for all, and His work applies even to the damned
regarding what is needed for the fullness of the human species:
All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in
this life [i.e., the resurrection life], as regards things pertaining to
the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to
grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of
natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.!I1
Since it takes an act of grace to restore the proper nature of the human
species, nature is fulfilled by the grace of God shown in Christ's incarnation, death, and resurrection. As regards physical death and the bodily
defects resulting from the Fall, this is true of the damned as well as the
saved. Indeed, Aquinas believes that
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption,
or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever,
purblindness, and so forth), will be entirely done away at the resurrection:]
Like the bodies of the saved, the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible,
restored to the fullness of their body-soul unity. Even the bodies of the
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damned will rise at the ideal age of around thirtyY The resurrection of the
damned restores the good of the human species, and in this way God
restores as much good to human nature as possible, even to the damned.
The continuance in being of the resurrected damned, therefore, is a metaphysical good, correcting the metaphysical horror of death and restoring
the order of nature lost at the Fall. The damned have the fullness of their
nature and are capable of knowing in the properly human way, by means
of phantasms. They can also feel passions, an important aspect of a distinctively human life. God is graciously giving them the most being that they
can possibly have, given the disordered nature of their wills. They conform
to Christ as much as they are capable, since they have the full, embodied
nature of the human species. Hell, especially after the resurrection, is a gracious gift, reflecting the love of God and His desire for creatures to join with
Him as much as possible. It also treats the damned with dignity, for treating a person according to justice is to treat him or her as a free, responsible
human being. Since this can only be done to a complete human being, body
and soul, it is fitting that the damned be raised with their bodies.
A critic may reply, All this talk about metaphysical goodness and
restoring the goodness of nature sounds good, but it ignores the basic
issue: the eternal suffering of the damned. Surely this is still incompatible with the existence of an omnibenevolent deity. We should remember that for Aquinas, the wicked not only suffer the pain of conscience
forever, but also the physical pain of literal fire. Being raised with all the
senses intact and an incorruptible body just seems to be a way that a
sadistic God can more thoroughly torture the damned for eternity.
Having their place in the divine order is no comfort for them."
The first thing to be said in response is that for Aquinas and any traditional thinker on hell, hell is a very bad place. It is a place reserved for those who
irrevocably reject, by their own free will, their highest end, God. Much of the
harm the damned suffer is due to their own evil wills. There is also a pain of
sense. Aquinas believes this to be a literal fire, but Geach has convincingly
argued that it can be reinterpreted as the inevitable pain resulting from evil
people attempting to exploit and abuse a reconstituted natural world. The
torment Geach describes might be physical (e.g., much of our suffering in
this life results from our pollution of nature) or psychological, since nature
will not yield to the wills of those who are evilY Since nature will obey God
and not the damned, nature will torment them as they try to make use of it."4
As for the eternity of hell, Stump argues that since the damned have made
evil their "second" nature, it is reasonable to hold that they will never choose
their ultimate end, God."" They can, however, live the best life they are capable of living in their twisted state, and this God mercifully allows them to do.
As Stump points out, to annihilate the damned would be a waste, eradicating their being, and thus would not be open to a good God.'"
Yet would the damned themselves see hell as merciful? Would not
they themselves prefer annihilation to their miserable existence? I am
not convinced that this would be the case. Surely there are many people
in this life who are miserable due to their evil way of life, but they still
desire to continue living. If we take away Aquinas' notion of hell as a
literal fire and reinterpret it, as does C. S. Lewis, as the damned being
U
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"left to themselves," it is not self-evident that the damned would prefer
annihilation to hell. Since they are in hell, they have chosen the self
against God (or have least tried to), and are therefore narcissistic anyway. In that case, why would they want to choose annihilation of the
only thing they have ever loved? And since they will still be rational
animals, even in hell, the instinct to survive, which is a part of animal
nature, will be intact.
So hell indeed reflects God's goodness, wisdom and love. As the
inscription over hell in Dante's Inferno reads:
Justice moved my great Maker; God eternal
wrought me; the power and the unsearchably
high wisdom, and the primal love supernal. 47

III.
In the concluding section, I will defend this position against three
important objections. The first objection is presented by Jonathan
Kvanvig, in opposition to Stump's position (and mine), that "being is the
fundamental value." Kvanvig argues that this is not necessarily true;
perhaps freedom is more fundamental.4 8 If freedom is more fundamental, then, if the wicked choose to be annihilated, this free decision should
be respected by God. Because God is omnipresent, and "there is no place
God is not,"49 to choose against being in the presence of God is to de facto
choose annihilation. If freedom is an essential part of our rational nature
(and it is the rationality of human nature which is so emphasized in
Thomistic philosophy), then to violate freedom violates our rational
nature. Thus,
To aim at the well-being of humans, one must aim at the realization of the potential of humanity for rationality. Because freedom
is an essential component of rationality, one could not aim at the
well-being of humans without honoring their freedom.50
Therefore, preserving the well-being of those who choose to be separated from the presence of God is to allow their annihilation.
One way to respond to Kvanvig's argument is this. The phrase,
"choosing against being in the presence of God" is ambiguous. It could
mean that the damned wish to continue to exist and act without the sustaining presence of God. In other words, they want to be separated from
God in a metaphysical sense-to live totally apart from God's presence.
But this desire is self-contradictory since, according to Christian theology, it is impossible for a being to continue to exist without the sustaining
presence of God. If God cannot cause contradictory states of affairs to
come to be, He cannot grant the damned their wish to live totally apart
from His presence. It goes beyond the evidence to say that what the
damned have really chosen is to be annihilated. The damned may well
recognize that God is omnipresent and that they cannot continue to exist
without His keeping them in existence; but perhaps what they really
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want is for God to leave them alone to fulfill their own selfish desires.
Their desire may not be so much to be apart from God in a metaphysical
sense as in a moral sense. By choosing the self and lesser goods above
God, they may simply be choosing to be left alone in their evil. Both the
damned and the saved are in the presence of God in a metaphysical
sense, since God must causally sustain them in being. But the damned
are separated from the presence of God in the sense that their free choice
of the self instead of God does not allow them to experience the Beatific
Vision, the vision of the essence of God. Even if the damned were
offered the Beatific Vision, they would experience it as painful, while the
saved experience it as joyful. Thus there are plausible interpretations of
the choice of the damned which do not lead to Kvanvig's conclusion that
they are de facto choosing annihilation.
A second objection begins by reminding us that Aquinas says "nothing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual."51 But all people have a
natural desire for happiness. If this is so, how can God allow people to
eternally exist in hell, where their "natural desire" for happiness will be
eternally unfulfilled? Surely, this is a case in which something contrary
to nature is perpetual. If God raises people from the dead to fulfill a natural desire out of respect for metaphysical order, why does He not guarantee that all be saved out of respect for the same metaphysical order?
This is indeed a difficult problem. It is true that happiness can ultimately be found only in the beatific vision of God. But the damned have
separated themselves from the beatific vision, and their "natural desire"
for happiness will remain unfulfilled. This state of affairs seems to be
impossible on Thomistic grounds. There is a tension here between freedom and nature and between metaphysical order and the wrong choices
of the damned, a tension which should not be minimized. Human freedom is what prevents God from fulfilling the natural desire of the
damned for happiness. God can raise the dead and fulfill the natural
desire to be, for the resurrection of all human beings is not contingent
upon free choice. But people who freely choose to reject God cannot live
in His presence, since this would violate their freedom. Nevertheless,
the damned do attain "happiness" to the degree that they are capable.
They return to God, as much as their free choices allow, by being
restored to the fullness of their body-soul natures. Unlike Aquinas, I
believe that they could freely choose God, and thus ultimate happiness,
but, as a matter of fact, they do not.
A final objection asks whether my argument implies that it is more
important to God to restore the metaphysical order of the universe than
to treat the damned with a just dignity and with love. The difficulty
with this objection lies in its separation of love, justice, and metaphysics.
But why should these be separated? The resurrection of the damned is a
restoration of metaphysical order, and not annihilating them does mean
that there is not a metaphysical "waste" of being. This understanding
does not imply, however, that it is not in accord with justice to resurrect
the damned and allow them to exist in hell. Neither does this imply that
it is unloving to do so. That the resurrection is made possible by the
work of Christ shows that, for Aquinas, the grace of God is needed to
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fulfill nature and restore metaphysical order. It is both the case that the
resurrection of all, including the damned, restores metaphysical order
and that such resurrection is a loving gift of grace to the damned. To
assert without further argumentation that this cannot be the case simply
begs the question.
This paper has defended the position that Eleonore Stump's point
about hell being good, both metaphysically and for the damned themselves is a fortiori true after the resurrection. The fullness of human
nature, as regards the species, is restored to all human beings, including
the damned. They live as complete human beings, soul and body, not
having to suffer the penalty of original sin, physical death. Human
nature is restored, and a breach in the order of the universe is healed by
the permanent reunion of human bodies and souls at the resurrection.
Thus even the resurrection of the damned contributes to the order of the
universe. The damned themselves are treated with all the respect, dignity, and worth they can possibly be given in light of their choice against
their ultimate end. This treatment reveals the love of God since He gives
the damned the best human existence they can possibly have. Given
their disordered wills, the misery they suffer in this eternity is their own
making, for they do not recognize the grace and love shown to them.
This is the ultimate tragedy in Aquinas' system. At the same time, we
should recall that this tragedy reflects, not on the goodness of God, but
on those who reject His grace.
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